On Wieseltier on Dennett

Many of you have probably seen the digraceful and disrespectful hack job of a review in yesterday's NY Times (what is up over there?) by Leon Wieseltier, of Daniel Dennett's new book Breaking the Spell. (Robin posted it a couple of days ago here.) It would be one thing if Wieseltier were simply confused, incompetent, or incapable of comprehending Dennett (all of which he is), but it is much worse: he knowingly and deliberately miscontrues what Dennett writes, repeatedly. I will give a single example from the beginning of Wieseltier's review:

If you disagree with what Dennett says, it is because you fear what he says. Any opposition to his scientistic deflation of religion he triumphantly dismisses as "protectionism." But people who share Dennett's view of the world he calls "brights." Brights are not only intellectually better, they are also ethically better. Did you know that "brights have the lowest divorce rate in the United States, and born-again Christians the highest"?

Dennett has written this book with a very wide audience in mind, and at the beginning of the book he tries his best to very honestly make clear his own beliefs and motivate readers (specially religious ones) to read the whole book before making up their own minds. This is what he says:

I ask just that you try to keep an open mind and refrain from prejudging what I say because I am a Godless philosopher, while I similarly do my best to understand you. (I am a bright. My essay The Bright Stuff, in the New York Times, July 12, 2003, drew attention to the efforts of some agnostics, atheists, and other adherents of naturalism to coin a new tern for us non-believers, and the large positive response to that essay helped persuade me to write this book. There was also a negative response, largely objecting to the term that had been chosen [not by me]: bright, which seemed to imply that others were dim or stupid. But the term, modeled on the highly successful highjacking of the ordinary word "gay" by homosexuals, does not have to have that implication. Those who are not gays are not necessarily glum; they're straight. Those who are not brights are not necessarily dim. They might like to choose a name for themselves. Since, unlike us brights, they believe in the supernatural, perhaps they would like to call themselves supers. It's a nice word with positive connotations, like gay and bright and straight...) [p. 21]

In this long parenthetical statement, Dennett is just putting his own convictions on the table. Nowhere does he claim that he thinks that he is brighter or smarter than others. On the contrary, he goes to pains to make himself clear on this. Two hundred and fifty-eight pages later, while considering evidence for the hypothetical claim that perhaps religion makes people morally better, he writes:

...when it comes to "family values," the available evidence to date supports the hypothesis that brights have the lowest divorce rate in the United States, and born-again Christians the highest (Barna, 1999). [p. 279]

This is just one of a long list of moral virtues that Dennett examines, always citing evidence of what he is saying, so nothing hugely important to Dennett's argument rests on this particular claim. But now reread how Wieseltier disingenuously and sleazily uses these quotes, from more than two hundred pages apart and completely out of context, to demonstrate Dennett's supposed arrogance. The rest of Wieseltier's review is filled with such ad hominem attacks on Dennett along with a few remarkably muddle-headed and pathetically feeble attempts at philosophical argument. It is Wieseltier's hubris which is unbelievable throughout, such as the risible notion that he understands Hume better than Dennett! (If you haven't read Hume yourself, imagine some editor at a science magazine lecturing a world-famous professor of physics on Einstein's theories, and you'll get some idea of just how ludicrous this is.)

No one who knows the first thing about philosophy can take this review seriously, but more importantly, it is so vindictive and poorly argued that nor can anyone else. Read it for yourself! It is an absolute disgrace that the NY Times not only published this rot, but felt so proud of it that they advertised it on the front cover of this week's Book Review, and then again drew attention to it on page four in a bizarre editorial introduction. How low will they sink?

I strongly urge you to protest this sort of intellectual terrorism and the extremely shabby treatment of one of the most well-repected and admired philosophers alive today by the Times, by writing to the publisher at [email protected], to the president at [email protected] and to the editor at [email protected].

Meanwhile, read Brian Leiter's review of Wieseltier's review:

The New York Times has done it again:  they've enlisted an ignorant reviewer to review a philosophical book.  The reviewer is Leon Wieseltier, the literary editor at The New Republic.  The book is Daniel Dennett's latest book, a "naturalistic" account of religious belief.   Whatever Mr. Wieseltier knows about philosophy or science, he effectively conceals in this review.  The sneering starts at the beginning:

THE question of the place of science in human life is not a scientific question. It is a philosophical question. Scientism, the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as physical, is a superstition, one of the dominant superstitions of our day; and it is not an insult to science to say so. For a sorry instance of present-day scientism, it would be hard to improve on Daniel C. Dennett's book. "Breaking the Spell" is a work of considerable historical interest, because it is a merry anthology of contemporary superstitions.

Perhaps it is correct that the "question of the place of science in human life" is a philosophical, not scientific question, though I wish I could be as confident as Mr. Wieseltier as to how we demarcate those matters.  But "the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as physical" is not a "superstition," but a reasonable methodological posture to adopt based on the actual evidence, that is, based on the actual, expanding success of the sciences, and especially, the special sciences, during the last hundred years.  One should allow, of course, that some of these explanatory paradigms may fail, and that others, like evolutionary psychology, are at the speculative stage, awaiting the kind of rigorous confirmation (or disconfirmation) characteristic of selectionist hypotheses in evolutionary biology.  But no evidence is adduced by Mr. Wieseltier to suggest that Professor Dennett's view is any different than this.  Use of the epithet "superstition" simply allows Mr. Wieseltier to avoid discussing the actual methodological posture of Dennett's work, and to omit mention of the reasons why one might reasonably expect scientific explanations for many domains of human phenomena to be worth pursuing.

More here. And then read P.Z. Myers' review of Wieseltier's review:

[Wieseltier's review of Dennett] is full of self-important declarations that reduce to incoherence, such as this one:

You cannot disprove a belief unless you disprove its content. If you believe that you can disprove it any other way, by describing its origins or by describing its consequences, then you do not believe in reason. In this profound sense, Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason.

One moment he's telling us that just tracing the origins of an idea is insufficient to disprove it (sadly for Mr Wieseltier's argument, there is no sign that Dennett disagrees), the next he's telling us that the origin of Dennett's reason is "creaturely" and "animalized", and therefore of a lesser or invalid kind. I had no idea we could categorize reason by the nature of its source (I'd like to know what varieties of reason he proposes: "creaturely", "human", "divine"? Is there also a "vegetable reason"?), but even if we could, by his initial premise, it wouldn't matter: he needs to address its content, not carp against it because it is the product of natural selection rather than revelation.

More here. And if you want still more, check out more reviews of the review at Majikthise, here.

Oh, and if you want to see my review of Dennett's book, it is here.

Comments

[mr.ed]

A number of years ago, our local music critic gave an unflattering review of a concert by one of the world's best orchestras. I saw him later that day and asked him why his remarks were so negative. His answer: "My job description is music critic, not public relations."

[beajerry]

This is an area where blogs (like this one and Pharyngula) are at their best - checking facts and knocking down fallaciousness.

Bravo!

[Bill Hooker]

I haven't read Dennett's book or the review, so can't comment on either. I will say, though, that business about "brights" is gob-smackingly stupid. Weasel and sidestep how he will ("supers" indeed), Dennett cannot pretend the term is not smug, self-congratulatory and condescending towards the "dims".

I generally like Dennett's writing and find him coolly rational, so I cannot understand why he persists with that "brights" nonsense, or how he fell into it in the first place.

[verbatim]

Wieseltier reveals his motivation for the attack in this sentence:

"If you disagree with what Dennett says, it is because you fear what he says."

It seems to me that the rest of the review centres on this sentiment: Wieseltier fears what Dennett says. The whole review was tinged with the slightly desperate tone of a person who is forced to face facts and arguments he cannot simply refute with reason. I got the distinct impression from the review that the author is a theist of some kind, who is also intelligent enough to understand the strength of Dennett's arguments.

This review reveals only the weakness of the reviewer, that he has to sink to such a level. I was laughing at the end of it, and as I wrote in a previous comment, I am more interested in reading it now, because it obviously terrified Wieseltier. It must really be good.

[Abbas Raza]

Bill,

I agree with you that the term bright is one which is just asking to be misinterpreted and therefore a bad choice. In Dennett's defense, he did not come up with it, but even so, he probably should have refrained from endorsing it, realizing that it will be misread every time (Dawkins also made the same mistake of endorsing it). I think this was done in a somewhat beleaguered political climate in which all political candidates MUST declare themselves to be church-going, etc., and in a spirit of defiance. Still, it is unnecessarily off-putting, yes.

But this doesn't excuse Wieseltier from ignoring everything Dennett said as explanation about the term and misinterpreting it DESPITE Dennett's appeals not to.

[Norman Costa]

I am disappointed in Leon Wieseltier's review of Dennett's “Breaking the Spell”, as much for its poor analysis, as for its closing, ad hominem insult. As a scientist, I know of no others who meet Mr. Wieseltier's definition of Scientism. They and Dennett are more accurately characterized as believing that science is the only arbiter for describing the properties of things in the natural world – things like liquid water, and theoretical constructs like the particle theory of subatomic phenomenon, and the evolution of religious behavior.

There is no problem in Dennett's assent to Hume's two questions regarding religion (its foundation in reason, and its origin in human nature), while not accepting Hume's response to the first. How many of us agree on a question while differing on our enlightened responses and discourses? Yet, Mr. Wieseltier uses the distinctions in Dennett's thought process to accuse him, inappropriately and unfairly, of misquoting and misrepresenting Hume.

Dennett is very clear, if not forthright to a fault, by saying he is offering his own speculation on what science may find in a study of religion as a natural phenomenon. Is he not explicit about doing so from the perspective of evolutionary (instrumental and functional) biology. Wieseltier seems to delight in uncovering Dennett's words on this, as if he has uncovered a secret, revealing passage, and hitting Dennett with a Gotcha!

Wieseltier dismisses Dennett's reasoning because Dennett's view presupposes human reason to be a natural phenomenon, based in biology. Then when Dennett uses the word 'transcend' to describe high levels of human reasoning, Wielseltier gives him another Gotcha!, and attaches the opprobrious label of 'animal' to Dennett's human reason. Wieseltier assumes an 'obvious truth' that human reason is a faculty that exists apart from its biology, a la Descartes. Well, here is where the discussion should begin. Instead, Wieseltier chose to end it, not prematurely, but before it even started.

Norman Costa

[JonJ]

Writing complaint letters to the Times is a good idea, but the important job is to get the word out as widely as possble that the Times' Magazine and Book Review are intellectually worthless. Basically, they are edited to titillate the fancies of the folks who buy the furs and condominiums they advertise. Why expect them to have any concern for non-commercial values like truth and rationality?

[Dabodius]

Hume wrote for the educated public, the citizenry of the republic of letters. Dennett claims to be addressing "as wide an audience of believers as possible" (though he plainly expects to be read by enthusaists for his work like Leiter and A.R.), so why isn't Wieseltier a worthy critic for that wide audience of believers? If W. doesn't argue in quite the way an analytical philosopher would, that puts him in company with almost all of D.'s purportedly intended audience. And it isn't as if D.'s armchair story-telling is specialist science -- it more resembles Marchen about the social contract, or Vico's thunderclap, which again were told for a broad reading public.
Why is a bad review "intellectual terrorism," as one of D.'s defenders has called it? Do we owe respect for personages in evaluating a book that purports to be an argument? And what nasty ad hominem concludes the review, whose last sentence is, "What this shallow and self-congratulatory book establishes most conclusively is that there are many spells that need to be broken." If the book is hoist on its own petard, or shallow and self-congratulatory (either in the sense of congratulating its project or its author), is it an ad hominem to say so? Abusive, circumstantial, or what?

[Abbas Raza]

Dabodius,

Your first point is a good one, and I am wrong. In other words, you are right that for a book meant for a wide audience, it is not necessarily a mistake to have it reviewed by someone representative of that audience. (Of course, it would be nice if that person knew something about the subject of the book.)

The reason I used the phrase "intellectual terrorism" is that I felt that by mounting (or giving space and exposure to) personal attacks on people like Dennett who are trying to broach what is for many a delicate subject, the Times is discouraging reasonable discussion by others, and contributing to a climate where one fears bringing up religion at all.

Every book is "self-congratulatory" in the trivial sense that it presents its own argument as correct. How could it be otherwise? And there is no other way in which Dennett's book is exceptionally self-congratulatory, either in tone or in substance.

As for whether the review is an ad hominem attack or not, Wieseltier throughout denigrates Dennett personally:

"In his own opinion, Dennett is a hero."

"Dennett is the sort of rationalist who gives reason a bad name..."

"Dennett flatters himself that he is Hume's heir."

"Dennett does not believe in reason."

ETC.

In fact, Dennett does none of these things. Decide for yourself if this kind of treatment counts as ad hominem or not.

Thank you for the comment.

[Lawrence Gage]

Comments on this post here:

Another Debunker Debunked

[MotherLodeBeth]

Bought the book and am enjoying it and learning a great deal. Love having my grey matter challenged. Do get a bit peeved when people who do not read a given book spout negative views of said book. It is one of my pet peeves re reviewers on Amazon.com and why I pass over reviews by people who cannot quote from the book in giving a review. Denotes to me that they just dont like the author and havent even bothered to read the book.

[Jeff]

Wikinews has a short article on this, but I've not yet seen anything on it in wikipedia.

Leon Wieseltier has a wikipedia page, but nothing there explains why he is so afraid of Dennett's idea. Is it postmodernism or religion?

[brymor]

I bought the book, and have actually read it! As a scientist, I find Dennett's argument unsatisfactory in several respects, but this puts me in a quandary.

The problem is that any informed criticism of Dennett's argument by a scientist is likely to be used by religious people to support their dubious arguments. Does this mean that we scientists must submit to self censorship, and not criticise Dennett's book? (I have actually posted my critique at http://www.highiqsociety.org/ but it is relatively 'safe' there, as it is only available to members).

Tricky, don't you think?

[Abbas Raza]

I think, Brymor, that you are too worried. Honest intellectual exchange will hurt no one. I would encourage you to express your criticisms of Dennett openly. This is not a debate that one must win at all cost, even suppressing disagreements with our own allies against religious nuts. Dawkins's pointed criticisms of Stephen Jay Gould, for example, may have delighted creationist crazies, but they did far more good than harm by clearly showing why group-selection just doesn't work. It is basically nearly impossible to change the mind of the religious, in any case.

I, for one, would be interested in seeing your critique of Dennett. And it may help other scientists who plan to examine the phenomenon of religion. That, in any case, is my opinion.

[brymor]

Thanks, Abbas, although still somewhat cautious, I agree with you. I've distilled down my somewhat lengthy critique of Breaking the Spell to the core arguments, as follows:

Dennett starts off well. First he shows that folk religion is a ‘natural phenomenon’ by uncovering its evolutionary basis. He identifies innate cognitive features which we inherit from our evolutionary precursors: a theory of mind (which he calls the ‘intentional stance’) and imprinting, as when gull chicks are pre-programmed to follow their mother. Dennett draws on work by the anthropologists Boyer and Atran on the evolution of the human mind to complete a picture of folk religion in which this imprinting of authority is extended from living parent figures to dead ancestors. To this he adds the innate animism of primitive humans which gives rise to ideas such as ‘rain gods’ and fertility symbols, and noting that Shamanic healing rituals ‘constitute hypnotic inductions’, speculates on the role of innate hypnotisability in Shamanic religion.

Dennett now moves on to describe how folk religions turn into organised religions by a process of cultural evolution, a development he attributes (following Jared Diamond) to the emergence of agriculture. As he says, the religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam have all culturally evolved from an original common source, the religion of Abraham. However, to explain this process he is not content to accept Diamond’s social/cultural model, nor the interesting marketing model of Stark and Finke: Dennett seeks to show that cultural evolution is Darwinian.

His argument goes as follows. There are some factual similarities between biological evolution (replication, variation, extinction) and cultural evolution. It follows that biological and cultural evolution are analogous. The best theory we have to explain the facts of biological evolution is Darwinism, this must therefore be the best theory to explain cultural evolution. Conclusion: cultural evolution is Darwinian.

Unfortunately, Dennett’s analogy fails. For a start, cultural evolution is closer to Lamarckism, which allows for the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Secondly, cultural evolution can include goal directed improvements which are specifically excluded from Darwin’s theory. Finally, Darwinism maintains that every form of life is directly descended from an earlier form, and consequently there is only one tree of descent. In contrast, cultural evolution consists of many evolutionary trees, each one starting with an original idea or discovery.

Dennett is obviously aware of the massive leap of faith he is requiring of his readers, so he conjures up a magic bullet to help clinch his argument: the meme. Memes, invented by Richard Dawkins in 1976, are ‘cultural replicators’, ideas which reproduce for the benefit of the idea, not the benefit of the people who pass them on. This concept (still much disputed among biologists, see Blackmore, Atran, Gould etc) is useful for explaining how harmful ideas can spread through a population (like parasites), but Dennett requires us to accept that the whole of culture consists of memes.

So we are to believe that a non-parasitic meme, such as the idea of the wheel, replicates for the benefit of the idea, not for the benefit of people – utility is nothing! Even if there were some truth in what Dennett is saying, Dawkins’s idea (selfish gene = selfish meme) is still only an analogy. Dennett and Dawkins should be fully aware of the dangers of arguing like this, after all the ‘theory’ of Intelligent Design is derived in the same way: ‘Biological evolution is analogous to cultural evolution, therefore biological evolution must incorporate intelligence and design’. Sorry, no.

Chasing the meme mirage leaves Dennett with a theory gap. Faced with the difficult subject of fundamentalism, he is reduced to offering a social prescription: we are ‘in the hands of “moderate” Muslims’, the only people who can restrain the fanatics. Had he maintained his biological stance, he would surely have asked the important question: is there an innate (biological) basis for fundamentalism, or is it a purely cultural construct? The optimistic view is that it is cultural, in which case it can be eliminated. The pessimistic view is that there is a biological component, in which case we cannot escape it, but might be able to mitigate it. Either way, we need to know, and Dennett is unable to tell us.