November 12, 2008
liar's poker redux
To this day, the willingness of a Wall Street investment bank to pay me hundreds of thousands of dollars to dispense investment advice to grownups remains a mystery to me. I was 24 years old, with no experience of, or particular interest in, guessing which stocks and bonds would rise and which would fall. The essential function of Wall Street is to allocate capital—to decide who should get it and who should not. Believe me when I tell you that I hadn’t the first clue.I’d never taken an accounting course, never run a business, never even had savings of my own to manage. I stumbled into a job at Salomon Brothers in 1985 and stumbled out much richer three years later, and even though I wrote a book about the experience, the whole thing still strikes me as preposterous—which is one of the reasons the money was so easy to walk away from. I figured the situation was unsustainable. Sooner rather than later, someone was going to identify me, along with a lot of people more or less like me, as a fraud. Sooner rather than later, there would come a Great Reckoning when Wall Street would wake up and hundreds if not thousands of young people like me, who had no business making huge bets with other people’s money, would be expelled from finance.
more from Conde Nast Portfolio here.
(This is one hell of a read, it may also be, I dare to say, an important read)
Posted by Morgan Meis at 10:56 AM | Permalink











Comments
While absurd to the point of making Kafka blush, not surprising to anyone paying attention.
When Reagan opened the casino doors in the 1980's, it has been horrifying to watch people gambling on a sinking ship, while selling the life boats for scrap.
It has made late stage capitalism a bit more interesting, and proved that even collapse can have a dark, comic character.
What is important is what is on the other side of the wall we are about to crash into, and how the survivors will respond.
If you are under 40 years old, you probably have not a clue what I'm talking about.
Posted by: Dave Ranning | Nov 12, 2008 11:44:59 AM
Oh gosh, people have taken to worshipping the Golden Calf again. In a TRULY free market, this penchant for money worship would disappear. ;)
Posted by: CriticalMassI | Nov 12, 2008 2:31:26 PM
quote:
“Then he said something that blew my mind,” Eisman tells me. “He says, ‘I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don’t have anything to buy.’ ”
That’s when Eisman finally got it. Here he’d been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There weren’t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors’ appetite for the end product. The firms used Eisman’s bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then, was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football: When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesn’t create a second Peyton Manning to inflate the league’s stats. But when Eisman bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create another bond identical in every respect but one to the original. The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower. The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. “They weren’t satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldn’t afford,” Eisman says. “They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That’s why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But that’s when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?”
end quote
Could somebody please explain this passage to me, as someone who has no handle on economics whatsoever and has only recently started paying attention? I get the feeling that it is related to the reason why the housing crisis cannot be wholly blamed on Democratic policies which encouraged lending to minorities - but I would like to be able to articulate this position better when the right-wingers in my family corner me over turkey dinner.
I almost got this guy's book out at the library today, coincidentally, but put it down because he really can't write. Any other reading suggestions (Economics for Dummies, perhaps?) would be most welcome!
Posted by: Mary | Nov 12, 2008 5:40:28 PM
I think this article is fantastic--the guy CAN write, at least in article form (better editors?).
this quote summed up the situation pretty succinctly:
“That Wall Street has gone down because of this is justice,” he says. “They fucked people. They built a castle to rip people off. Not once in all these years have I come across a person inside a big Wall Street firm who was having a crisis of conscience.”
Posted by: missvolare | Nov 13, 2008 7:44:01 AM
BTW, for mary, what that section is trying to elucidate is the fact that CDO traders were building "investment" packages out of worthless/insecure collateral (AAA,AA,A,B,BB,BBB are the levels of risk or probability of default) and then using statistical "forecasts" to label the packages in aggregate as less risky than they were in reality. I've a very vague idea of all that tottle too, having only taken Prob/Stats in college and read the Economist and FT for about 12 years.
Posted by: missvolare | Nov 13, 2008 7:50:53 AM
Let me venture a layman's interpretation of the passage Mary quotes (and perhaps tempt a more knowledgeable reader to correct me and really explain this junk to us!)
A credit default swap (CDS) is like insurance on a loan that you've made to a company (i.e., a bond of theirs that you've bought). Obviously, the bondholder (or loanmaker, if you will) has an interest in owning this piece of insurance, just like I have an interest in owning some insurance on my own life/house/car etc.
What happened is that people without an interest in a particular bond would buy a CDS as a bet. If you think a company is going to default on its bonds, why not pick up the insurance payoff, without actually having to buy the bond (i.e., loan the money) in the first place. I think this is what Lewis/Eisman refer to as "shorting" these bonds - basically betting that they will fail.
The analogy is if, say, you thought my house was going to burn down. Why not buy some insurance on my house, without having to actually buy the house, and collect the payoff when it burns down? (and yes, third parties can buy insurance like this, including on your life - look up "dead peasant's insurance" or COLI). All you have to do is make the premium payments in the meantime.
Anyway, if a dozen (or however many) third parties buy this insurance on my house, then they are making premium payments as long as the house doesn't burn down. And this creates a revenue stream that is not actually connected to anything. If my actual house, and my premium payments on the insurance for that house, represent a single revenue stream, then suddenly there are a dozen "phantom" houses stacked up on top of mine, each providing a revenue stream. Same thing with the CDSs. Each actual mortgage bond could have, potentially, a limitless number of revenue streams stacked on top of it, based on how many people were buying CDSs on that bond (betting that it would fail).
If I am right about how this works, it's pretty obvious how bad an idea it is. For one thing, the worse a bond is (i.e., the more likely my house is to burn down - say I live next to a gasoline refinery), the easier it is to find people like Eisman willing to make this bet that it will fail, to buy a CDS and to create a phantom revenue stream. And then when the bond inevitably does fail, the insurance provider (and this is what got AIG in trouble, I believe) has to make a payoff to everyone who bought a CDS on the bond. It's like if they had to reimburse not only me, for my burnt down house, but also everyone who bet that it would burn down.
Posted by: A reader | Nov 13, 2008 9:42:39 AM
The best supplement to this article are two public radio shows (http://jeffmilner.com/index.php/2008/10/08/this-american-life-on-the-financial-crisis/). Actually these shows are far better than this article.
Posted by: shahbaz | Nov 13, 2008 9:48:50 AM
OK brilliant, thanks. It is starting to make a little sense (about how it doesn't make sense).
And missvolare, you're right, I misspoke, since he clearly shows in this piece that he can write. Better editing, or just older/wiser - who knows? In any case, great article.
Posted by: mary | Nov 13, 2008 7:01:22 PM
Mary, here's some more:
Ed borrows $1,000,000 from Bank for 30 years at 6% to buy a house. He'll pay Bank about $6,000 per month unless he defaults.
Immediately after the deal, before interest rates have changed and before Ed has defaulted, Bank has something that's worth $1,000,000: Ed's mortgage.
Martin thinks that Ed looks shaky, and so he asks Bank if he can borrow the mortgage. Bank says "Sure, but you need to put up a million in collateral and pay us $6,000 per month until you return the mortgage." Martin agrees, takes the mortgage, sells it to China for a million, hands the million to Bank for collateral, and starts dipping into his own funds to make the monthly payments.
After one year, Ed defaults. Martin says to China "I will buy that mortgage back now for $750,000." China agrees. Martin returns the mortgage to Bank and stops making payments. Bank moves to foreclose.
After all this, Martin has made $178,000. He gained $250,000 by selling and re-buying the mortgage from China and paid $72,000 to Bank during the year.
Make sure your clear on the story so far, because now it gets interesting.
It turns out that at the beginning, China was not the only one bidding for Ed's mortgage. China had a friend, Switzerland, who wanted it too. So what Bank did is ask Martin whether he still thought Ed looked shaky. Martin said he did, so Bank said "if you pay us another million and another 6,000 per month, we'll lend you a like-a-mortgage that you can sell to Switzerland."
Martin asked, "What's a like-a-mortgage?" Bank said, "It's where we agree to pay $6,000 per month so long as Ed is paying." Martin asked, "Where will you get $6,000 since there is no Ed?" Bank said, "We will get it from you." Martin said "Ah. You think Switzerland will go for this?" Bank said "Yes, we think so." Martin asked "What does Switzerland get out of this?" Bank answered "$6,000 per month." Martin said "We need to take Ed's name off this, because someone might notice," and Bank said "We will pool a thousand Eds and sell chunks of the pool," and it turned out Bank was right, and Switzerland went for it.
So now, there's just one house, and one Ed, but there are two things in the financial system that will go down if Ed stops paying.
And it multiplied.
And that's how one million dollar house dropping 250 thousand in value can cause 250 million in losses.
Posted by: T L Holaday | Nov 15, 2008 12:04:48 PM
T L Holaday, So it wasn't the Community Reinvestment Act that caused the mess. Would you say it's a failure of a laissez-faire market, the free market that's supposed to yield the best for everyone if Keynesian Neanderthals would get out of the way? The Austrian economics purists who've been pushing Milton Friedman or Ludwig von Mises for a few decades might say it's merely evidence of what happens in regulated markets.
Also, I really don't understand the example you spelled out, how or why people thought this bundling and selling of nothing would yield profits. Do you have additional sources (besides articles above) so that people like Mary and me could better grasp the concept of "derivatives"?
Posted by: CriticalMassI | Nov 15, 2008 1:35:42 PM
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